A new conceptual key generation scheme is presented by using intrinsic quantum correlations of single photons between Alice and Bob. The intrinsic bi-partite correlation functions allow key bit to be generated through high level communication language i.e. a key bit is directly encoded to shared correlation functions not to the state and detection of a photon at Bob does not mean key bit.
or 'no' of his guess. After the signal transmission, Alice then tells Bob through classical channel about the sequence of groups {Ψ, Φ} that she has randomly chosen. Bob can then know Alice's key bit by the outcome of his measurement regardless he made a right or wrong guess, so doubling the raw key generation rate.
To illustrate the scheme more systematically, we will discuss an example of the key generation as shown in Fig.2 .
Step − 1: Alice randomly chooses the Ψ{C 1 , C 2 } or Φ{C 3 , C 4 } by choosing the waveplates combination in Box 1 as shown in Fig.1 . (Alice randomly chooses the C n is analog to choosing a random basis in BB84.) Step − 2: Alice fixes her polarizer at angle θ 1 = +45
• and records the valid detections of the ancilla photon in '+' SPD3 and '-' SPD4 as bit '1' or '0'.
Step − 3: Bob guesses on the C n by projecting his polarizer at angles θ 2 = ±45
• . The
(Alice only chooses one polarization angle θ 1 = +45
• and Bob chooses two polarization angles θ 2 = ±45
• because of the shared C n . We do not need to perform the violation of Bell inequality in Ekert's protocol. And also, not like BBM92, Alice and Bob do not need to measure the basis (0 • , 90 • ) of the incoming photon.)
Step − 4: The outcomes of Bob's guess through the valid detections of signal photon.
'Yes' means that the'+' SPD1 'click' or his guess is right. 'No' means that the '-' SPD2 'click' or his guess is wrong. However, Bob did not know the Alice's key bit yet.
(Alternative: Alice and Bob can detect the presence of Eve by broadcasting part of the results obtained by Bob in step 3 and 4. They did not leak any bit information to Eve because Alice will not announces the group information in step 5 for the exposed data. Note that in BB84, Alice and Bob announce their choice of bases, and Bob never broadcast his result which is the key bit.)
Step − 5: After the signal transmission, Alice announces to Bob through classical channel about the group of her choice (Φ, Ψ), not revealing her choice of correlation function.
Step − 6: Bob knows Alice's key bit after he received the group information and verified with the record of his valid detection. To illustrate this, let's say for the first column, Alice announces to Bob that the group is Φ. Bob's guess on the group Φ is C 4 , which is corresponding to bit '1'. However, he knows that the guess is wrong through his valid detection in step 4. From here, he knows Alice's key bit is bit '0'.
(The random choices of C n in Alice and projection angle θ 2 = ±45
• in Bob did not need to discard half of the raw keys compared to BB84 where Alice and Bob have the wrong bases.)
We believe that this scheme can provide the raw key generation rate a factor of 2 higher than the BB84 [17] and B92 [18] , and double the communication distance as in the simplified EPR (BBM92) [9] and the original Ekert's protocol [19] . We would outline the detail explanation of each step. [20] [21] [22] [23] , which is proven to be more efficient secure encryption system over long distances. Note that we apply phase coding αη system on a single photon level instead of mesoscopic coherent state.
The random phase φ m = ±90
• is unknown to Bob and Alice. With the assumption of low mean photon numbers for n x and n y , the two weak coherent states can be treated
, where we have considered the vacuum and one photon number state in mode x or y. The phase φ m = ±90
• is not included here because we have treated the φ m in the annihilation operatorbe i(±φm+φ A ) . Four types of intrinsic bi-partite correlation functions at Alice is given by,
The expectation values for the correlation {C 1,2 } are given by,
respectively. While the expectation values for the correlation {C 3,4 } are given by,
respectively. We have neglected the 
B. Step 3, 4: Guess and Verify
The annihilation operatorĉ at beam 2 is transformed through a quarter waveplate (QWP4) at 45
• and a polarization analyzer (HWP3 and PBS1). The photon number operator at Bob is given by,
and then the expectation value is given by
Bob has the same interference term cos(2θ 2 + φ m ) for all the C n because the QWP4 is projected at the fixed angle +45 Bob's '+' SPD1 will detect the signal photon meaning 'yes'. Similarly, for Ψ{C 2 , θ 1 = +45
• , θ 2 = −45
Since each group {Ψ, Φ} has bit '0' and '1' associated with its correlation function C n and depended on random phase φ m = ±90 
III. DISCUSSION
Weak coherent state is usually vulnerable to photon-number splitting attack i.e Eve can tap one signal photon from beam 2 and perform the same measurement as Bob did. In this protocol, we make use of the phase coding αη system [20] [21] [22] [23] to secure beam 1 and beam 2 from Eve attacks. One can also use differential phase shifted method to distribute operatorsĉ andd at the output of the BS1. The protocol can prevent more than one photon in a coherent pulse by applying the condition n x = n y = n c < 1. For example, 2 photons in beam 2 can be attributed to higher photon number in (x, y) mode such that |1 x |1 y , |0 x |2 y , |2 x |0 y , which will have the expectation value of ĉ †ĉ as given by
y + 2n x n y + 2n y √ n x n y cos(2θ 1 + φ m + 2n x √ n x n y cos(2θ 1 + φ m ). It is more sensitive to the condition n x = n y or it will introduce more errors on Bob if the condition n x = n y is not fulfilled, even though its contribution is in the order of mean photon number n c less than the one photon number case (|1 x |0 y and |0 x |1 y ). In other words, the existence of multiple photons will introduce the percentage of errors in Bob even without the presence of Eve.
The percentage will also be the amount information leaking to Eve in the photon-number splitting attack.
In intercept-resend attacks, Eve knows that the bit information is not encoded in the Step 5 yet.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have presented unique feature of a new scheme based on intrinsic quantum correlation of weak coherent states for generating key bits between Alice and Bob through high level communication language. The scheme preserve the randomness of the light source for doubling the communication distance, and also increase the success rate of raw key generation compared to Ekert's protocol, and double the sift key rate compared to weak coherent light protocol.
